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Bankruptcy
by Hon. James D. Walker, Jr.*
Amber Nickell"*
and Tim Colletti**"
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article focuses on bankruptcy opinions issued in 2012 by the
courts in the Eleventh Circuit.' The topics are varied, ranging from the
constitutionality of bankruptcy-specific exemption schemes enacted by
the states to the ever-growing body of law arising from the means test.
II.

PROFESSIONALS

Chapter 7 presents an attorney fee dilemma. Potential Chapter 7
clients often do not have the money to pay fees in full before filing, and
prepetition debts-including attorney fees-are discharged through the
very proceedings the attorney advises. This conundrum forces bankruptcy attorneys to invent creative methods for collecting fees from Chapter
7 debtors.
In 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District
of Florida prohibited Clark & Washington's practice of taking postdated
checks as a prepetition retainer for postpetition services2 because
* U.S. Bankruptcy Judge, Middle District of Georgia. Augusta State University (B.A.,
1970); University of South Carolina (J.D., 1974). Member; State Bar of Georgia.

** Law Clerk to the Honorable James D. Walker, Jr.; Chapman University (B.A., 1993);
Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 2001). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.

*** Law Clerk to the Honorable John T. Laney, III; University of Georgia (B.A., 2004);

Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 2009). Member, State Bars of

Georgia and Illinois.
1. For an analysis of bankruptcy law during the prior survey period, see James D.
Walker, Jr. & Amber Nickell, Bankruptcy, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 63 MERCER L. REV.
1161 (2012).

2.

See Walton v. Clark & Washington, P.C., 454 B.R. 537, 539 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011)

(Clark I).
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depositing the checks either violates the automatic stay or the discharge
injunction, depending on when the checks are deposited.3 In response,
Clark & Washington implemented a two-contract system whereby a
client signs one contract prepetition agreeing to prepetition services and
another contract postpetition agreeing to postpetition services.4 The
United States Trustee challenged this system in Walton v. Clark &
Washington, P C.,5 decided in 2012.
At an initial hearing, the court expressed concerns over the adequacy
of disclosures in the prepetition contract and how the transition from one
contract to the other was a single continuous process; the client had no
time to think about whether to choose Clark & Washington for
postpetition services.6 Clark & Washington modified its procedure to
alleviate the court's concerns.7
The court ultimately approved a two-contract procedure, in which the
prepetition contract explains the two-contract system in detail and
describes the client's legal options postpetition-proceed pro se, retain
Clark & Washington, or retain another firm.8 Instead of being required
to sign the postpetition contract immediately after the petition is filed,
the client has a two-week "cooling off period" to decide among those
three options? The firm agrees to represent the client during this twoweek "gap period" so the client is not left unrepresented.1 ° Sua sponte,
the court ordered certain modifications regarding the conspicuousness of
the two-contract system in the prepetition agreement (including a
separate disclosure the client must sign): the addition of provisions
allowing the client to cancel the postpetition contract within fourteen
days of signing it, and the inclusion of language in the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 2016" disclosure confirming that the firm
will represent the debtor in any event until the court allows the firm to
withdraw. 2

3. Id. at 545; see also Walton v. Clark & Washington, P.C., 469 B.R. 383, 385 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 2012) (Clark II).
4. Clark H, 469 B.R. at 383-84.
5. 469 B.R. 383 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012).
6. Id. at 385.
7. Id. at 385-86.

8. Id. at 386-88.
9. Id. at 386-87.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 387 (internal quotation marks omitted).
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2016.
Clark H, 469 B.R. at 387-88.

2013]

BANKRUPTCY

III.

851

CLAMS

A.

Claim Objections
In the Southern District of Florida, scheduling a debt and then
objecting to the related proof of.claim may result in sanctions for the
debtor's attorney, as seen in In re Velez. 3 The case involved challenges
by the debtor to five proofs of claim on the ground that they violated
Local Rule 3000-1(A)(3) because they did not include documentation
showing the debtor owed the amount claimed, and they violated section
727.104 of the Florida Code14 because they did not include evidence of
assignment of the debt. The debtor requested that each claim be
disallowed in full. Each proof of claim corresponded to a debt listed on
the debtor's schedules. In each case, the amount of the debt, the account
number, and the original creditor matched. However, each proof of claim
also noted a change in the owner of the debt.15
Rather than disallowing the claims, the court issued an order for the
debtor's attorney to show cause why he should not be sanctioned for
violating Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011(b). 16 The court
first pointed out that the laws cited in the claims objections were
irrelevant to the claims allowance. 7 Local Rule 3000-1(A)(3) simply
does not exist. Additionally, § 727.104 of the Florida Code only applies
to a state court "assignment for the benefit of creditors" proceeding,
which had not been commenced as to any of the claims."8

13. 465 B.R. 912 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2012).
14. FLA. STAT. § 727.104 (2012), availableat www.leg.state.fl.us.
15. In re Velez, 465 B.R. at 914-17. The claims were as follows: (1) claim two for
$506.02 made by Chase Bank for Kohl's account number 5095, scheduled as $492 owed to
Kohl's on account number 5095; (2) claim three for $17,268.74 made by FIA Card Services
for Bank of America on account number 0084, scheduled as $17,268 owed to Bank of
America on account number 0084; (3) claim five for $8,380.69 made by Candica, LLC for
Barclay's Bank account number 4346, scheduled as $8,295 owed to Barclay's on account
number 4346; (4) claim seven for $6,240.33 made by Evergreen for Chase account number
1273, scheduled as $6,240 owed to Chase on account number 1273; (5) claim eight for
$23,103.96 made by Portfolio Recovery for Chase account number 0605, scheduled as
$23,103 owed to Chase on account number 0605. Id.
16. Id. at 914; FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011(b).
17. In re Velez, 465 B.R. at 918; see also FLA. STAT. § 727.103 (2012 & Supp. 2013),
available at www.leg.state.fl.us.
18. In re Velez, 465 B.R. at 918. In Florida, common law and statutory rights may be
assigned unless such assignment is expressly prohibited by statute. Id. The court found
no defect in the assignment because the debtor's counsel failed to cite "any statute or case
law giving rise to a good faith argument that the assignments were statutorily prohibited
or against public policy." Id. But see Pursley v. eCAST Settlement Corp. (In re Pursley),
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Next, the court explained why sanctions were appropriate against
debtor's counsel, noting that there was no basis for objecting to the
claim.' 9
If a debt is undisputed, no other creditor has filed a proof of claim for
the debt, and the debtor doesn't present any evidence to dispute the
debt or ownership of the debt, the objection to claim should be
overruled based upon the preponderance of the evidence. To hold
otherwise is to invite mischief[] 20
It would encourage debtors to challenge otherwise undisputed claims by
demanding documents that "claimants simply cannot produce timely or
economically."2
This would allow debtors to evade a debt on a
technicality even though both the debtor and claimant acknowledged the
debt under penalty of perjury-the debtor by listing the debt in his
schedules, and the claimant by filing a proof of claim.22
Because the debtor's attorney was "unable to provide any evidence or
even supply a meaningful explanation to justify filing of any of the
offending claim objections," the court found he violated the duty imposed
by Rule 9011 to make a reasonable investigation before signing and
filing a document-in this case the specious claim objections. 23 As a
consequence, the court suspended the attorney from practicing before it
for thirty-one days.24
Not all courts take the same approach. In 2011, the court in Pursley
v. eCAST Settlement Corp. (In re Pursley)2' disallowed a claim when the
debtor admitted the debt but denied any knowledge of the claimant, who
was an assignee of the original creditor. 2' Although the claimant
produced an affidavit from the transferor of the claim stating that its
business records reflected the assignment, the court found insufficient

451 B.R. 213, 234 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2011) (disallowing a claim when the debtor admitted
the debt but denied any knowledge of the claimant and the claimant failed to produce
documents showing assignment of the debt as necessary to enforce the debt under Georgia
law).
19. In re Velez, 465 B.R. at 919-22.
20. Id. at 919 (internal citation omitted).
21. Id. (quoting In re Habiballa,337 B.R. 911, 916 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
22. Id. at 921.
23. Id. at 920; FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011.
24. In re Velez, 465 B.R. at 921.
25. 451 B.R. 213 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2011).
26. Id. at 234.
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The court, therefore,

B.

Tax Liability
Section 505(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code29 authorizes bankruptcy
judges to determine a tax liability, including one that has been
previously assessed by taxing authorities.3 ° However, under § 505(a)(2)(C), the court may not make such a determination as to an ad valorem
tax on property of the bankruptcy estate "if the applicable period for
contesting or redetermining that amount under [applicable nonbankruptcy] law has expired."3 ' In Dubov v. Read (In re Read),32 the
debtor owned twenty investment properties in Florida. Ad valorem
property taxes were assessed as to the properties on October 12, 2009.
Under Florida law, the debtor had sixty days to challenge the assessment. On day twenty-nine, she filed a bankruptcy petition. On day 191,
she filed a challenge to the tax claim in the bankruptcy court seeking a
redetermination of her tax liability under § 505.33 The bankruptcy and
district courts found the request for reassessment to be timely.34 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed and
reversed.35
Typically, § 108 of the Bankruptcy Code36 tolls nonbankruptcy
statutes of limitations that are unexpired on the petition date.37 The
sixty-day Florida deadline for challenging tax assessments was a
nonbankruptcy deadline that had not expired on the petition date. The
debtor therefore argued § 108 served to toll the Florida deadline such
that it remained unexpired at the time she filed her challenge to the tax
claim in bankruptcy court.3" As a result, the bankruptcy court had

27. Id. at 217, 233-34.
28. Id. at 234.

29. 11 U.S.C. § 505(a)(1) (2006).
30. Id.
31. Id. § 505(a)(2)(C) (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
32. 692 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2012).

33. Id. at 1188.
34. Id. at 1187.
35. Id.
36. 11 U.S.C. § 108 (2006).
37. Id. "If applicable nonbankruptcy law ... fixes a period within which the debtor
may commence an action, and such period has not expired before the date of the filing of

the petition, the trustee may commence such action only before the later of... two years
after the order for relief." Id.
38. In re Read, 692 F.3d at 1188-89.
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authority to reconsider the tax claim under § 505(a)." 9 The circuit court
was unpersuaded by the debtor's argument.4"
The court found both the plain language of §§ 108 and 505 and public
policy supported a finding that § 108 did not toll the Florida tax
deadline. 41 First, the language of § 505(a)(2)(C) prohibits a redetermination of tax liability if the deadline for contesting a tax "under
applicable nonbankruptcy law" has expired.42 The applicable nonbankruptcy law in this case gave the debtor sixty days to challenge her tax
assessment; she filed her challenge on the 191st day, well after
expiration of the deadline.4 1 "[Blecause § 108(a) is not a nonbankruptcy
law, its extension of the time period is irrelevant for purposes of
Thus, the bankruptcy court was barred from redeter§ 505(a)(2)(C). '
mining the debtor's tax claim.45
From a policy perspective, § 505(a)(2)(C) was added to the Bankruptcy
Code in 2005 as part of a package of amendments intended to protect
creditors.4 6 In the case of § 505(a)(2)(C), Congress's protection involves
"prohibiting a debtor from contesting ad valorem tax claims after the
time for filing an action challenging the assessment of such taxes has
expired under state law." 7
C.

Priority Claims

Before Kerr v. Meadors (In re Knott),4" no court in the Eleventh
Circuit had addressed whether overpayment of child support is a
domestic support obligation (DSO) entitled to priority under § 507(a)(1)(A). 49 The debtor filed a no-asset Chapter 7 case on November 20,
2009. Her ex-husband filed a proof of claim for a DSO in the amount of
$41,581.79. He obtained a judgment in that amount from a Florida state
court in April 2010 due to overpayment of child support. The exhusband made his support payments through an automatic deduction
order. The overpayments occurred when the debtor (1) unilaterally and

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 108, 505.
In re Read, 692 F.3d at 1187.
Id. at 1190; see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 108, 505.
In re Read, 692 F.3d at 1190.
Id.
Id.

45. Id. at 1192.

46. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 505(a)(2)(C). Ironically, the Act effecting the amendments
is titled the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005. Pub. L.
No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
47. In re Read, 692 F.3d at 1191.
48. 482 B.R. 852 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2012).
49. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1)(A) (2006); In re Knott, 482 B.R. at 854.
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improperly increased the amount of the deduction order and (2) refused
to cooperate in terminating the order after she lost custody of the
children. The debtor received a discharge on March 11, 2010, and the
case was closed with no distributions to creditors. In August 2011, the
Chapter 7 trustee reopened the debtor's bankruptcy case to administer
a newly discovered prepetition asset. At that time, the trustee objected
to the ex-husband's proof of claim and sought to reclassify it as a general
unsecured claim. The ex-husband argued the claim was entitled to
priority as a DSO, while the debtor argued she owed no money to her exhusband.5 °
The court agreed with the ex-husband and held his claim was a
priority DSO.5 1 The court reviewed case law on the topic and noted
that claims for overpayment of support were generally treated as DSOs
if needed for the support of the creditor or children in his custody.52 In
Knott, the ex-husband had full custody of the children during part of the
overpayment period and partial custody during the remainder of the
overpayment period.5 3 Based on these facts, the court concluded "the
repayment obligation to [the former spouse] may properly be characterized as intended for and in the nature of support for the child."5 4 It

also noted that the obligation otherwise satisfied the definition of
"domestic support obligation" under § 101(14A). 55 Therefore, the
overpayment was entitled to priority as a DSO. 6
IV. AVOIDANCE
A struggling business entering into a repayment plan with a
creditor is a regular business occurrence. Struggling businesses often
end up as bankruptcy debtors, and payments to creditors made within
ninety days of filing for bankruptcy are avoidable as preference
payments under § 547(b),57 forcing the creditor to return the amounts
to the bankruptcy trustee. One defense to a § 547(b) avoidance action
is that the payments were made in the ordinary course of business
pursuant to § 547(c)(2).58 In Bender Shipbuilding & Repair Co. v. Oil

50. In re Knott, 482 B.R. at 853-54.

51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 856.
Id. at 854-56.
Id. at 856.
Id.

55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) (2006).
In re Knott, 482 B.R. at 856.
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2006).
See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (2006).

856

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

Recovery (In re Bender Shipbuilding & Repair Co.),59 the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Alabama addressed
whether payments made within the § 547(b) preference period pursuant
to a repayment plan are60 subject to the ordinary-course-of-business
defense under § 547(c)(2).
The debtor had been a major customer of the creditor since 1988. In
2008, the debtor's payments became late so often that the creditor
contacted the debtor about the late payments. The debt grew, and in
January 2009 the debtor and the creditor agreed on a repayment plan,
pursuant to which the debtor made payments until June 9, 2011. On
June 9, four creditors filed an involuntary Chapter 7 petition against the
debtor.6 1
It was undisputed that the creditor received $123,837.25 within the
§ 547(b) preference period.62 The creditor argued, however, that it was
entitled to keep that money under the § 547(c)(2) ordinary-course-of-business defense.63 Section 547(c)(2) states that a preference cannot be
avoided
to the extent that the transfer was (1) in payment of a debt incurred
by the debtor in the ordinary course of business of the debtor and the
transferee and either (2) made in the ordinary course of business of the
debtor and the transferee or (3) made according to ordinary business
terms.64
The parties did not dispute that the debt was incurred in the ordinary
course of business; they disputed whether the payments under the
repayment plan were made
in the ordinary course of business between
65
the debtor and creditor.
The creditor argued that despite its twenty-year business relationship
with the debtor before the repayment plan, the January 2009 agreement
established a "new normal" payment structure between the parties and
that the preference payments were made pursuant to that ordinary
course.6 6 The creditor relied on MarathonOil Co. v. Flatau (In re Craig
Oil),6" an Eleventh Circuit opinion quoting legislative history for the
proposition that "the general policy of the preference section [is] to

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

479 B.R. 899 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2012).
Id. at 904; see also 11 U.S.C. § 547.
In re Bender Shipbuilding, 479 B.R. at 901-02.
Id. at 902.
Id. at 903.
Id. at 903-04; see also 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2).
In re Bender Shipbuilding, 479 B.R. at 904.
Id.
785 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1986).
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discourage unusual action by either the debtor or his creditor during the
debtor's slide into bankruptcy."6 The agreement was entered into
before the debtor's slide into bankruptcy and was therefore ordinary
course between the parties. 6' The debtor argued that "ordinary course"
should be viewed in light of the entire twenty-year business relationship. 70 Thus, the January 2009 repayment plan was "unusual"
compared to the ordinary relationship between the parties since 1988. 7'
The court agreed with the debtor.72 In an Eleventh Circuit case cited
by the creditor, the court stated that § 547(c)(2) "should protect those
payments which do not result from 'unusual' debt collection or payment
practices."7 3 The payments the debtor made under the repayment plan
were "from unusual debt collection or payment practices" because the
creditor told the debtor that the creditor could no longer afford to do
business with the debtor, which was "an unusual debt collection practice
between the parties."74 The parties introduced no evidence that they
had ever, let alone ordinarily, entered into a repayment plan in the prior
twenty years. 75 'Therefore, the payments made pursuant to that
agreement that occurred during the preference period were incident to
that unusual agreement and 76were not ordinary between the parties as
contemplated by § 547(c)(2)."

V.

EXEMPTIONS

A state can opt out of the Bankruptcy Code's exemption statute77 and
restrict bankruptcy debtors to those exemptions set forth in the state's
exemption law.7

Some opt-out states, including Georgia, have enacted

bankruptcy-specific exemptions separate from the state's debtor-creditor
law exemptions. 79 During the survey period, three opinions from cases
where debtors challenged Georgia's bankruptcy-only exemption statute

68. Id. at 1566 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 373 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6329); In re Bender Shipbuilding, 479 B.R. at 904.
69. In re Bender Shipbuilding, 479 B.R. at 904.

70. Id.
71. Id.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id. (quoting In re CraigOil, 785 F.2d at 1566).
Id. at 905.
Id.

76. Id.
77. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (2006).
78.
79.

See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (2006).
See O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100 (2002 & Supp. 2012).
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were rendered.'0 Because the facts of each case and the analysis of
each opinion are similar, this Article will only examine one of these
cases: In re Joyner."'
The Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) allows exemptions
"for purposes of bankruptcy and intestate insolvent estates." 2 Section
44-13-100(a)(9)P allows a bankruptcy debtor to exempt up to $2000 of
the cash surrender value of a whole life insurance contract.' O.C.G.A.
§ 33-25-11,85 which is not part of Georgia's bankruptcy exemption code,
protects the entire cash surrender value of a whole life insurance
contract by making the contract's value unreachable to the insured's
creditors.' The debtors in In re Joyner exempted $2000 of multiple
policies' cash surrender value under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(aX9) and
attempted to exempt the remainder of the value under O.C.G.A.
§ 33-25-11. The United States Trustee objected to the latter exemption,
arguing that § 33-25-11 did not apply to bankruptcy debtors. The
debtors argued that Georgia's bankruptcy-specific exemption statute was
unconstitutional under multiple clauses of the state and federal
constitutions.
The debtors argued that the statute violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Georgia constitution." Because bankruptcy debtors are
not a suspect class and because the statute did not restrict a fundamental right, the court reviewed the statute under the "rational relationship
test," 9 which permits a classification when it is based on rational
distinctions and is directly related to the legislation's purpose. 0
Bankruptcy debtors seek to discharge their debts while nonbankruptcy
debtors continue to pay their debts.9 ' The tradeoff for bankruptcy's
fresh start is to relinquish whatever property the Georgia legislature
does not allow to be exempted.9 2 The court found the distinction in
treatment between what a bankruptcy debtor can exempt and what a

80. See In re McFarland, 481 B.R. 242 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2012); In re Joyner, 489 B.R.
292 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2012); In re Dean, 470 B.R. 643 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2012).
81. 489 B.R. 292 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2012).
82. O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100.
83. Id. § 44-13-100(a)(9).

84. Id.
85. O.C.G.A. § 33-25-11 (2005 & Supp. 2012).
86. See id.
87. In re Joyner, 489 B.R. at 294.
88. GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 2; In re Joyner, 489 B.R. at 294.

89.
S.E.2d
90.
91.
92.

In re Joyner, 489 B.R. at 294 (citing Grissom v. Gleason, 262 Ga. 374, 377, 418
27, 30 (1992)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 294-95.
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nonbankruptcy debtor can exempt to be rational.9" Although the
debtors did not challenge the statute under the federal Equal Protection
Clause, 4 the court noted that even if they did, the argument
would
"5
have failed "just as it did under the similar state provision. 7
The debtors also challenged the statute as violating the United States
Constitution's Bankruptcy Clause9" and Supremacy Clause. 7 The
Bankruptcy Clause states Congress can "establish... uniform Laws on
the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States."9" Relying
on an older Supreme Court case, the debtors argued that Georgia's
bankruptcy-only exemption statute violates the Bankruptcy Clause's
Uniformity Provision because it breaches geographic uniformity.99 The
court dismissed this as a misinterpretation of case law and noted that
the case the debtors relied on "recognized that states may have differing
exemptions available to debtors in bankruptcy."100 Moreover,
the
01
Uniformity Clause "is not a restriction upon the states."
The court likewise found the Supremacy Clause challenge meritless;
Georgia's exemption statute was intended to opt out of the federal
exemption scheme in favor of its own exemptions.' 2
Congress
expressly permitted this in § 522(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, the court
said, and thus the two exemption statutes do not conflict and the
Supremacy Clause is not violated. 103
VI.

DISCHARGE

Question: When does a fraudulent transfer result in a willful and
malicious injury to property of a creditor for purposes of § 523(a)(6)?0'T
Answer: When the transfer is made to prevent a creditor from satisfying
a judgment. The creditor in Maxfield v. Jennings (In re Jennings),1'°
a young boy paralyzed in an accidental shooting, filed a personal injury
lawsuit in California state court against Bruce Jennings, who owned a

93. Id.
94. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
95. In re Joyner, 489 B.R. at 297.
96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
97. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2; In re Joyner, 489 B.R. at 295-97.
98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
99. In re Joyner, 489 B.R. at 295 (citing Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181,

188 (1902)).

100. Id.
101. Id. at 296 (citing In re Cross, 255 B.R. 25, 31 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2000)).
102. Id. at 297.

103. Id.
104. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2006).
105. 670 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2012).
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gun distributor, and his two ex-wives--Janice and Anna (among others).
While the lawsuit was pending, Janice, at Bruce's direction, transferred
an unencumbered parcel of real property to Anna. 10 6 The creditor then
ified a complaint in California against Janice for fraudulent transfer.
Several months later, the California court found the gun distributor
liable for the creditor's injuries but had not yet ruled on the liability of
Bruce, Janice, and Anna. Bruce and Janice filed bankruptcy petitions,
and the state law cases were transferred to the bankruptcy court. The
bankruptcy court found Janice jointly and severally liable for the
creditor's personal injury claim and liable for the fraudulent transfer
claim. Shortly thereafter, the creditor filed a complaint to determine the
dischargeability of the fraudulent transfer of debt under § 523(a)(6) for
willful and malicious injury.'
The bankruptcy court found in favor
of Janice.'
The district court reversed, and the the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed.'0 9
The circuit court considered three elements: (1) an injury to property
of the creditor; (2) willfulness; and (3) malice.10 With respect to the
injury, Janice argued that because the personal injury judgment arose
after the transfer, the transfer caused no injury."' The court, however, said the relevant fact was that the creditor obtained a fraudulent
transfer judgment prior to asserting a § 523(a)(6) claim."' "[Tihe
bankruptcy court found that Janice Jennings knowingly conspired with
Bruce to transfer [the property] with the intent to keep its value from
[the creditor's] reach.""' 3 By preventing the creditor from "satisfying
his personal injury claim," Janice injured his interest in that claim." 4
The court further concluded Janice acted willfully because "[s]he knew
that the purpose of the transfer was to keep [the property] out of the
reach of creditors.""' And, she acted maliciously--or without just
cause-because "she knew Bruce had no legitimate reason to transfer"

106.
Janice.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1330. The property was owned by a partnership created by Bruce and
at
at
at
at

1330-31.
1331-32.
1332, 1334.
1333.

at 1334.
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the property to Anna." 6 Thus, the debt arising from the
fraudulent
7
transfer claim was nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).
In a second discharge case, the Eleventh Circuit considered § 523(a)(4),118 which excepts from discharge those debts arising from the
debtor's "fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity,
embezzlement, or larceny."" 9 "Defalcation" under this section does not
have an exact definition, 2 ' and the circuits are split over what conduct
constitutes defalcation."' The Eleventh Circuit, in Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A (In re Bullock),'22 determined that defalcation under
§ 523(a)(4) requires "more than mere negligence" and "a known breach
of a fiduciary duty, such that the conduct can be characterized as
objectively reckless."' 23
The debtor in Bullock was the trustee of his father's trust. The life
insurance policy was the trust's sole asset, and the trustee could only
borrow from the trust to pay the premiums and to satisfy a beneficiary's
withdrawal request. Violating those limiting provisions, the trustee used
the life insurance policy as collateral for three loans. Trust beneficiaries
discovered these loans and sued the debtor for breach of fiduciary
duties. 2 4 The court awarded the plaintiffs $285,000, but in the order
awarding damages the court stated that the debtor did "'not appear to
125
have had a malicious motive in borrowing funds from the trust."
The property acquired through the self-dealing was put under a
constructive trust to secure the judgment, as was the debtor's beneficial
interest in his father's trust. BankChampaign (the Bank) replaced the
debtor as trustee. The debtor tried to sell the property to satisfy the
judgment, but the Bank's approval was required, and the Bank
obstructed efforts to sell. The debtor filed for bankruptcy hoping to
discharge the judgment debt. The bankruptcy court found the debt
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(4). The district court affirmed, and
while the court opined that the bank's actions were inappropriate, the
bank's actions did not make the debt dischargeable.' 26 On appeal to

116.

Id.

117.

Id.

118.

11 U.S.C. § 523(aX4) (2006).

119. Id.
120.
121.
2012).

122.

Quaifv. Johnson, 4 F.3d 950, 955 (11th Cir. 1993).
Bullock v. Bank Champaign, N.A. (In re Bullock), 670 F.3d 1160, 1165 (11th Cir.

670 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2012).

123. Id. at 1166.
124. Id. at 1162.
125. Id. (quoting uncited state court order).
126. Id. at 1162-63.
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the Eleventh Circuit, the debtor argued that his breach of fiduciary duty
did not rise to defalcation under § 523(a)(4),
and the Bank's behavior
127
gave him a defense to nondischargeability.
The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the standards used by other circuit
courts."2 The United States Courts of Appeal for the Fourth, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits hold that a fiduciary's innocent act can result in
defalcation. 129 The United States Courts of Appeal for the Fifth, Sixth,
and Seventh Circuits require recklessness.1 30 The United States
Courts of Appeal for the First and Second Circuits require extreme
recklessness. 3 ' In a previous Eleventh Circuit opinion, Quaif v.
Johnson,3 2 the court referred to an old Second Circuit case, Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Herbst,3 ' as having "perhaps the best"
description of defalcation under § 523(a)(4).1 4 That opinion described
defalcation as requiring a known breach of duty and not mere negligence. 35 Although Quaif was not binding, the court followed its
"explicit alignment" with Central Hanover and held that defalcation
under § 523(a)(4) requires a known breach of duty that rises to the level
of objective recklessness.136 Because the debtor at least should have
known he was self-dealing, and he knowingly benefitted from the loans,
his conduct could be characterized as objectively reckless; thus, the court
137
held the conduct rose to the level of defalcation under § 523(a)(4).
The debtor's contention that the Bank's behavior created a defense to
nondischargeability also failed. Although bankruptcy courts are courts
of equity and the bank asked for relief with arguably unclean hands, the

127. See id. at 1163-64.
128. Id. at 1165-66.
129. Id. at 1165 (citing Republic of Rwanda v. Uwimana (In re Uwimana), 274 F.3d
806, 811 (4th Cir. 2001); Tudor Oaks Limited Partnership v. Cochrane (In re Cochrane),
124 F.3d 978, 984 (8th Cir. 1997); Sherman v. SEC (In re Sherman), 658 F.3d 1009, 1017
(9th Cir. 2011)).
130. Id. at 1165-66 (citing NFS, Ltd. v. Harwood (In re Harwood), 637 F.3d 615, 624
(5th Cir. 2011); Patel v. Shamrock Floorcovering Servs., Inc. (In re Patel), 565 F.3d 963,
970 (6th Cir. 2009); Follett Higher Educ. Grp., Inc. v. Berman (In re Berman), 629 F.3d
761, 766 (7th Cir. 2011)).
131. Id. at 1166 (citing Rutanen v. Baylis (In re Baylis), 313 F.3d 9, 20 (st Cir. 2002);
Denton v. Hyman (In re Hyman), 502 F.3d 61, 68 (2d Cir. 2007)).
132. 4 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 1993).
133. 93 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1937).
134. Quaif,4 F.3d at 955 (citing Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 93 F.2d at 512); see
also In re Bullock, 670 F.3d at 1164.
135. In re Bullock, 670 F.3d at 1166 (citing Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 93 F.2d
at 512).
136. Id.
137. Id.

2013]

BANKRUPTCY

863

debtor did not cite any cases holding a creditor's unclean hands renders
an otherwise nondischargeable debt dischargeable. 3 '
On May 13, 2013, the Supreme Court vacated the Eleventh Circuit's
decision.'39 The Court held the state of mind required for defalcation
is "knowledge of, or gross recklessness in respect to, the improper nature
of the relevant fiduciary behavior." 4 ° Because the Eleventh Circuit
had applied the less stringent "objective recklessness" standard, the case
was remanded for further proceedings.'
VII.

CONSUMER ISSUES

A.

Lienstripping
Last year, this Article discussed the debtor's ability to void or "strip.
off' a wholly unsecured lien in the context of a Chapter 20 case (a
42
Chapter 13 case filed soon after receiving a Chapter 7 discharge).
In such circumstances, the Chapter 13 debtor typically is not eligible for
a discharge. 43 The bankruptcy courts in the Eleventh Circuit are split
over whether a Chapter 13 debtor who is ineligible for a discharge may
legally strip off a wholly unsecured lien.1 The issue currently is the
subject of a direct appeal request to the circuit court 45 and may soon
be resolved.'46
In the meantime, the Eleventh Circuit has decided McNeal v. GMAC
Mortgage, LLC (In re McNeal), 4 7 which, if it stands, may render the
Chapter 20 lienstripping question moot. In McNeal, a Chapter 7 debtor
sought to strip off a wholly unsecured second lien on her house under
§§ 506(a) and (d)' 48 Section 506(d) provides that "[tlo the extent that
a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured

138. Id. at 1167.
139. Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A., No. 11-1518, 2013 WL 1942393, at *7 (2013).
140. Id. at *3.
141. Id. at *7.
142. See Walker & Nickell, supra note 1, at 1180-82.
143. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f)(1) (2006).
144. See Walker & Nickell, supra note 1, at 1180-82.
145. Typically bankruptcy cases are appealed first to the district court and then to the
circuit court. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2006). However, the circuit court may take a direct
appeal in certain circumstances. Id. § 158(d).
146. The bankruptcy court held that "eligibility for a discharge is not a requirement to
strip off of a wholly unsecured junior mortgage in a chapter 20 case." In re Scantling, 465
B.R. 671, 673 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012).
147. 477 F. App'x 562 (11th Cir. 2012).
148. Id. at 563; 11 U.S.C. § 506(a), (d) (2006).
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claim, such lien is void."149 Under § 506(a) a claim is only a secured
claim to the extent of the value of the collateral. 150 Thus, when a
senior lien consumes all the value in a piece of collateral, the junior
lienholder's claim will be an unsecured claim pursuant to § 506(a). The
circuit court allowed the debtor to strip off the lien based on its 1989
decision, Folendore v. United States Small Business Administration,'5'
in which the court had previously held that a Chapter 7 debtor could use
§ 506(d) to strip off a wholly unsecured lien.'5 2
153
After Folendore, the Supreme Court decided Dewsnup v.

1mm,

holding that a Chapter 7 debtor could not use § 506(d) to strip down a
partially unsecured junior lien because the phrase "allowed secured
claim" in § 506(d) means a claim that has been allowed and is secured
by a lien.'
It is not defined by reference to § 506(a).155 The Eleventh Circuit held it could not rely on Dewsnup to depart from its prior
precedent in Folendore because Dewsnup was not exactly on point, as it
involved a partially secured lien rather than a wholly unsecured
lien.156 If Folendore and McNeal remain the law in the Eleventh
Circuit, Chapter 20 debtors can deal with wholly unsecured liens in their
Chapter 7 cases, so the liens never become an issue in the later Chapter
13 case.
The creditors in McNeal have filed an application for rehearing en
banc."57
'
However, that application is currently stalled due to a
complication. The creditors (the mortgagee and the servicer) have filed
bankruptcy cases and claim the appeal is subject to the automatic stay.
However, because the creditors sold their interest in the mortgage, the
debtor contends the automatic stay does not apply. There is also a
question of whether or not the new mortgagee and servicer should be
substituted as parties for the original creditors.

149.

11 U.S.C. § 506(d).

150. Id. § 506(a).
151. 862 F.2d 1537 (llth Cir. 1989).
152. In re McNeal, 477 F. App'x at 564. In Folendore, the court allowed the debtor to
strip off a wholly unsecured third lien on its real property because the creditor did not have
an allowed secured claim. 862 F.2d at 1540-41.
153. 502 U.S. 410 (1992).
154. Id. at 417; see also 11 U.S.C. § 506(d).
155. Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417.
156. In re McNeal, 477 F. App'x at 564.
157. In re McNeal, 477 F. App'x 562 (11th Cir. 2012), petition for rehearingen banc
filed (11th Cir. June 1, 2012) (No. 11-11352).
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Chapter 13 Plans

In the right circumstances, above-median Chapter 13 debtors can buy
their way out of Chapter 13 by paying off their plan early with a lumpsum payment, even if unsecured creditors will not be paid in full. In In
re Tibbs, 56 the debtor's confirmed plan provided for total payments
over sixty months of $14,850, with $11,726 going to general unsecured
creditors (a 6.8% dividend). Less than a year after confirmation, the
debtor wife lost her job. Without her income the debtors were unable to
make the plan payments. They proposed to modify their plan to pay the
remaining plan payments in one lump sum. The wife's parents agreed
to gift the necessary funds to the debtors but only if the modification
court allowed the modification over
was approved.15 9 The 16bankruptcy
0
the trustee's objection.
The court noted that Eleventh Circuit precedent requires an abovemedian income debtor to pay into a plan for sixty months (the applicable
commitment period) unless unsecured creditors will be paid in full. 6'
However, the circuit case arose in the context of plan confirmation,
162
which requires conformance with §§ 1325(b)(4) and (b)(1)(B).
Subsection (b)(4) defines the applicable commitment period as sixty
months for above--median income debtors,16 3 while subsection (b)(1XB)
prevents the court from confirming a plan over objection unless the
debtor devotes all disposable income to unsecured creditors over the
applicable commitment period. 1 4 By contrast, the debtors in Tibbs
sought modification under § 1329.165 Section 1329 incorporates several
other sections of Chapter 13, including § 1325(a). 6 6 However, it does
not incorporate the applicable commitment period requirements set forth
in § 1325(b).167 Thus, the court allowed the modification because it
was proposed in good faith and satisfied all the requirements of
§ 1329.168

158.
159.
160.
161.
2010)).
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

478 B.R. 458 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2012).
Id. at 460.
Id. at 467.
Id. (citing Whaley v. Tennyson (In re Tennyson), 611 F.3d 873, 874 (11th Cir.
Id. at 466; 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4), (b)(1)(B) (2006).
11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4).
Id. § 1325(b)(1)(B).
478 B.R. at 467; 11 U.S.C. § 1329 (2006).
11 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(1); In re Tibbs, 478 B.R. at 467.
11 U.S.C. § 1329; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b).
In re Tibbs, 478 B.R. at 467; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1329.
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C. Means Testing
In 2011, the Supreme Court held that when using the means test to
calculate a Chapter 13 debtor's disposable income, a debtor who does not
make a car payment may not deduct a vehicle ownership expense from
his current monthly income. 169 In In re Rivers, 70 the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida considered the
applicability of Ransom in the context of Chapter 7 means testing to
determine whether the case is presumptively abusive.'71 The debtor
in Rivers filed a statement of intent to surrender her former residence.
However, when taking deductions on the means test she subtracted the
monthly mortgage payment and 1V60th of the amount necessary to cure
the arrearages on the mortgage.172 With the deductions, the debtor's
case was not presumptively abusive;
without the deductions, the
173
presumption of abuse did arise.
Under § 707(b)(2XA)(iii), 174 the debtor may deduct from her current
monthly income "average monthly payments on account of secured
debts," which are calculated as "the total of all amounts scheduled as
contractually due to secured creditors in each month of the 60 months
following the date [of the filing] of the petition."'75 The Ransom
decision involved § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii), 176 which allows the debtor to deduct
from current monthly income "applicable monthly expense amounts
specified under the [IRS's] National Standards and Local Standards." 7 The bankruptcy court in Rivers noted that the Supreme
Court determined the means test was designed to ensure that debtors
who could afford to repay their debts did so.178 Thus, the means test
should include expenses the debtor actually incurs. 79 However, the
Supreme Court also "recognized that the purpose of the Means Test in
Chapter 13 cases differs significantly from its purpose in Chapter 7

169. Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., 131 S. Ct. 716, 725 (2011).
170. 466 B.R. 558 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012).
171. Id. at 561. Under 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(1), the court may dismiss the case of an
individual Chapter 7 debtor with primarily consumer debts if the case is abusive. Under
§ 707(b)(2), abuse is presumed if the debtor's income after deducting allowed expenses and
payments exceeds a statutorily defined threshold. 11 U.S.C. § 707 (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
172. In re Rivers, 466 B.R. at 560.
173. Id. at 561.
174. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii).
175. Id.
176. Id. § 707(bX2)(A)(ii).
177. Id.
178. 466 B.R. at 564 (citing Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 721, 725).
179. Id.
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cases.""8 The bankruptcy court elaborated on this distinction. In
Chapter 13, "[tlhe goal is to determine whether the debtor is submitting
all of his 'projected disposable income' to his Chapter 13 plan."181 By
contrast, in Chapter 7 the goal "is to determine whether the granting of
relief would be an abuse of the provisions of Chapter 7 .,,12 Thus, in
Chapter 7 the means test functions "'as a screening mechanism,'"'"
which "should be applied as of the date that the Chapter 7 petition is
filed, without consideration of whether the debtor's expenses may change
after that date." 1" Thus, because the debtor owned her residence on
the petition date, she could deduct mortgage payments on the means
test, notwithstanding
the intent to surrender the residence in the
1
future. 85
Even when the presumption of abuse does not arise, § 707(b)
(3)(B)' 8 provides an alternative test for determining whether a
Chapter 7 filing is abusive. It states that the court shall consider "the
totality of the circumstances" when determining whether granting relief
would be an abuse of Chapter 7.1s 7 The issue for the Eleventh Circuit
in Witcher v. Early (In re Witcher)"s was whether a bankruptcy court
can consider ability to pay debts under the totality-of-the-circumstances
test of § 707(b)(3) after the court has already determined that a
presumption of abuse under § 707(b)(2)-where ability to pay was
already considered-did not arise.'i 9
The debtors opted to keep certain luxury items and continue paying
the debts secured by those items. The bankruptcy court found no
presumption of abuse under the means test of § 707(b)(2), but the court
found the debtors' ability to pay and unwillingness to surrender the
luxury items-which would have provided a meaningful distribution to
unsecured creditors-indicated that granting relief would be an abuse
under the totality of the circumstances. The court gave the debtors

180.
181.
182.

Id. at 566.
Id. (citing Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2475 (2010)).
Id. (citing Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 722 n.1).

183. Id. (quoting Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 722 n.1).
184. Id. at 568.
185. Id.
186. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3XB).
187. Id. In Rivers, the court noted that the existence of this second basis for a finding
abuse supported its conclusion that the means test should be administered in Chapter 7
based on the facts on the petition date. 466 B.R. at 567-68. Even if the debtor survives
the means test based on the facts as of the petition date, the court may still dismiss the
case as abusive based on the totality of the circumstances, including future events. Id. at
568.
188. 702 F.3d 619 (11th Cir. 2012).
189. Id. at 620.
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fourteen days to convert to Chapter 13; the debtors did not convert, and
the court dismissed the case.19 ° The district court affirmed.19' On
appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, the debtors argued that once they pass
the means test, which accounts for ability to pay, the court should not
again look at ability to pay when viewing the totality of the circumstances. Reconsidering factors considered in the means test, they argued,
would make the means test meaningless.192
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, describing the debtors' reading of
§ 707 as "narrow" and stated that § 707(b)(3)(B) "broadly refers to 'the
totality of the circumstances ...of the debtor's financial situation,'
phrasing which is surely intended to include the debtor's ability to pay
his or her debts."193 The court also found support in the "textual
evolution" of § 707.194 Prior to the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, the phrase "totality of the circumstances" was absent from
§ 707.195 Nevertheless, courts used the totality of the circumstances
test prior to 2005, and in doing so, they "uniformly took the ability to
pay into account. "' 9
D. Conversion
The courts are split over whether equity accumulated during a
Chapter 13 plan belongs to the debtor or to the estate after conversion
to Chapter 7.197 In In re Robinson,9 ' the Bankruptcy Court for the
Middle District of Florida held that the accumulated equity does not
belong to the Chapter 7 estate. 199 Section 348(f)(1)(A) °° of the Bankruptcy Code states that estate property in a converted case consists of
whatever was estate property as of the original filing date that the
debtor still has on the conversion date;201 § 348(f)(2)02 provides that
if a Chapter 13 debtor converts to another chapter in bad faith, estate
property in the converted case consists of estate property as of the

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id.
Id. at 621.
Id.
Id. at 622; see also 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3)(B).
In re Witcher, 702 F.3d at 622.
Id.
Id.

197. In re Robinson, 472 B.R. 854, 856 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012).
198. 472 B.R. 854 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012).

199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 857.
11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(1)(A) (2006).
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(2).
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conversion date.2"'
The court found that § 348 was intended to
incentivize repayment of debts under Chapter 13 rather than liquidations under Chapter 7-if accumulated equity belonged to the Chapter
7 estate, an honest Chapter 13 debtor who later had to convert would be
penalized for attempting to repay debts.2°4 Converting in bad faith,
however, moves the date for determining estate property to the
conversion date, and equity acquired as of the conversion date belongs
to the estate." 5 The statutory scheme and legislative history showed
that "Congress did not intend that a Chapter 13 debtor should lose the
benefit of equity acquired in an asset due to his or her compliance with
Chapter 13 payments."2 6
VIII. CHAPTER 12
Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code allows individual farmers to adjust
their debts through a plan of reorganization.0 7 To be confirmed, a
Chapter 12 plan must conform to the requirements of § 1222 of the
Bankruptcy Code.208 Section 1222(a)(2) requires that the plan provide
for the full payment "of all claims entitled to priority under section
507." °s In other words, no portion of priority claims can be discharged. Section 1222(a)(2)(A) downgrades the status of certain priority
claims-claims of a governmental unit arising from the sale of farm
assets that are entitled to priority under § 507.1 ° Instead, these
claims are treated as general unsecured claims and may be discharged
to the extent they are not paid in full.21 ' One such priority claim is a

claim for "any tax... incurred by the estate." 212 Thus, § 1222(a)(2)(A)
appears to strip taxes resulting from the sale of farm assets during a
Chapter 12 case of their priority status.
In Hall v. United States, 213 the Chapter 12 debtor sold his farm
postpetition, and his plan treated the resulting capital gains tax as a
general unsecured debt that would receive only partial payment. 14
The issue for the Supreme Court was whether the taxes were "incurred

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id.
In re Robinson, 472 B.R. at 856.
Id. at 857.
Id.
See 11 U.S.C. ch. 12 (2006).
11 U.S.C. § 1222 (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
Id. § 1222(a)(2).
Id. § 1222(a)(2)(A).
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1XB)(i) (2006).
132 S. Ct. 1882 (2012).
Id. at 1886.
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by the estate" and thus dischargeable to the extent not paid in full.215
Resolving a circuit split,216 the Court held that the tax liability was not
incurred by the estate and thus the § 1222(a)(2)(A) exception did not
apply to deprive the taxes of their priority status. 17 Instead, the taxes
were neither collectible in Chapter 12 nor dischargeable.21 8
Examining several dictionary definitions of "incur," the Court
concluded that a tax "'incurred by the estate"' has a plain meaning of"a
tax for which the estate itself is liable."219 The Internal Revenue Code
(IRC) addresses tax liability in bankruptcy-§ 1398 of the IRC220 states
that Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 estates are liable for taxes,2 2' and IRC
§ 1399222 states that except as provided in § 1398, filing for bankruptcy
does not create a separate taxable entity.2 '

The Court concluded,

In Chapter 12 and 13 cases, then, there is no separately taxable estate.
The debtor ...is generally liable for taxes and files the only tax

return.... The postpetition federal income tax liability is not
"incurred by the estate" and thus is neither collectible nor dischargeable in the Chapter 12 plan.2 4
The Court noted that these IRC sections sufficiently resolved the
issue,225 but the Court advanced several other arguments to support
its holding, including a statutory structure argument.226 Chapter 12
was modeled on Chapter 13, and courts interpreting sections of Chapter
12 often rely on opinions construing similar Chapter 13 sections as
authority.227

Section 1322(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code 2 8 is the

Chapter 13 analog to § 1222(aX2)-both sections require the payment of
§ 507 claims. 229 Bankruptcy courts, commentators, and the Internal
Revenue Service have all treated postpetition taxes of a Chapter 13

215. Id. at 1885; see also 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(BXi).
216. Hall, 132 S. Ct. at 1886.
217. Id. at 1893.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1887.

220. 26 U.S.C. § 1398 (2006).
221. Id. § 1398(a).
222. 26 U.S.C. § 1399 (2006).
223. Hall, 132 S.Ct. at 1887; see also 26 U.S.C. § 1399.
224. Hall, 132 S. Ct. at 1887.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1889.
227. Id. (citing 8 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY 1200.01[5] at 1208-10 (Alan N. Resnick
& Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2012)).
228. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2) (2006).
229. Hall, 132 S. Ct. at 1889.
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debtor as a liability of the debtor, not the estate.230 The Court saw "no
reason to depart from those established understandings."2 3'
Four justices dissented.1 2 Armed with floor statements from
Senator Charles Grassley, the chief sponsor of § 1222(aX2)(A), the
dissent argued that the exception's clear purpose was to protect
postpetition asset sales from tax liability.~" Many Chapter 12 debtors
have to sell land or assets at a price that results in substantial capital
gains taxes, the dissent noted, and if those taxes are treated as priority
claims, many Chapter 12 plans would be underfunded and thus
unconfirmable. 2 4 In response to the opinion in Hall, Senator Grassley,
along with Senator Al Franken, introduced the Family Farmer
Bankruptcy Tax Clarification Act of 2012,"' 5 which would effectively
reverse the majority's decision. 236 Congress did not act on the bill
prior to the end of the 112th Congress. As of this writing, it has not
been reintroduced in the 113th Congress.
IX. CHAPTER 11
In an 8-0 decision, the Supreme Court held that a secured creditor
must be allowed to credit bid when its collateral is being sold free of
liens through a Chapter 11 cram down plan. 237 The debtors in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank23" borrowed $142
million from the lender, secured by the debtors' assets, to finance hotel
construction and renovations. They ran out of money before completing
the project and filed Chapter 11 cases. The debtors proposed a plan that
provided for the sale of all their assets but barred the lender from credit
239
bidding ("using the debt it is owed to offset the purchase price").
Because the debtors sought confirmation of the plan over the secured
lender's objection (a cram down), they had to prove the plan was fair and
equitable to the lender under § 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code.
The bankruptcy court and the United States Court of Appeals for the

230. Id. at 1889-90.
231. Id. at 1890.
232. Id. at 1894 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
233. Id. at 1896.
234. See id. at 1894, 1897.
235. S. 3545, 112th Cong. (2012).
236. See Press Release, Senator Chuck Grassley, Senators Look to Reverse SCOTUS
Ruling on Family Farmer Bankruptcies (Sept. 14, 2012), availableat httpi/www.grassley
.senate.gov/news/Article.cfin?custome.dataPageID_1502=42441.
237. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065,2073 (2012).
238. 132 S. Ct. 2065 (2012).
239. Id. at 2068-69.
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Seventh Circuit found the plan unconfirmable and refused to approve bid
procedures for the sale of assets.' ° The Supreme Court affirmed. 1
To be considered "fair and equitable" to an objecting secured creditor,
the plan must (1) allow the creditor to retain its lien and receive
deferred cash payments; (2) give the creditor a lien on the proceeds of
the sale of its collateral and allow the creditor to credit bid; or (3)
provide the creditor with the indubitable equivalent of its claim. 2
Because the debtors proposed to sell the lender's collateral, but barred
credit bidding, they could only cram down the plan under clause 3-by
providing the lender with the indubitable equivalent of its claim. 3
However, relying on the canon of statutory interpretation that the
specific governs the general, the Court concluded that the debtors could
not use clause 3 to take an action expressly prohibited by clause 2.2
Such a reading is supported by the structure of § 1129(b):
(i) is the rule for plans under which the creditor's lien remains on the
property, (ii) is the rule for plans under which the property is sold free
and clear of the creditor's lien, and (iii) is a residual provision covering
dispositions under all other plans-for example, one under which the
creditor receives the property itself. 5
Because the debtors' plan proposed to sell the lender's collateral free of
liens, the plan could not be confirmed unless the lender were allowed to
credit bid.246
X. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to find any common threads in this year's cases; 2012 is
perhaps most notable for its diversity. It has also set in motion certain
anticipated developments. Significantly, as described in Part VII.A.,
2013 may be the year that multiple open questions on the issue of
lienstripping in consumer cases are resolved. In addition, the Eleventh
Circuit's interpretation of defalcation in Bullock, reported in Part VI., is
set for review by the Supreme Court. 7

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id. at 2069.
Id. at 2073.
Id. at 2070 (summarizing 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (2006)).
Id.
Id. at 2070-71.
Id. at 2072.
Id.
In re Bullock, 670 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 526 (2012).

